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INTRODUCTION 
Global climate change is a multi-faceted international crisis that 
requires creative and flexible regulatory solutions.  Addressing the 
principal anthropogenic cause of climate change—carbon dioxide 
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels—has been the focus of the 
international response to global climate change to date.1  However, a 
significant and often overlooked source of global carbon dioxide 
emissions is deforestation, which accounts for up to eighteen percent 
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 1. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, 216 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (establishing emissions 
reduction targets and timetables pursuant to which parties must reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions to 1990 levels by an average of 5% below their 1990 levels over a five-year 
commitment period from 2008–2012).  For a discussion of the need to address alternatives to 
traditional command-and-control emissions reductions and apply more flexible regulatory 
approaches in the fight against climate change, see generally Jillian Button, Carbon:  
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the Currency 
Market, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571 (2008); Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible 
Mechanisms for Climate Change Compliance: Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean 
Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 44 (2008); Robert DeLay, Our Post-Kyoto 
Treaty Climate Change Framework: Open Market Carbon-Ranching as Smart Development, 17 
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 55 (2008); Albert Mumma & David Hodas, Designing a Global Post-
Kyoto Climate Change Protocol That Advances Human Development, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 619 (2008); Romulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The 
Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism 
Ten Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634 (2008); Sophie Smyth, Can 
Business Learn to Love the Environment?  The Case for a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund, 58 
RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (2006). 
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of global carbon dioxide emissions annually.2  Tropical forests store 
120-400 tons of carbon per square hectare of vegetation, which is 
released into the atmosphere when the forests are burned or 
harvested.3 
The critically important role that forests play in international 
carbon release and storage has been a recent focus of negotiations of 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol in Bali, 
Indonesia4 and Poznan, Poland.5  The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012,6 
and negotiations for the terms of its successor are underway as of this 
writing.7  A focus of these negotiations is that it is essential to 
establish regulatory mechanisms to help curb emissions from tropical 
deforestation in any effective post-Kyoto plan to combat global 
climate change.8 
Despite increasing awareness of the link between deforestation 
and climate change, tropical deforestation rates are accelerating 
dramatically.  International deforestation in the past 240 years has 
caused a net release of approximately 121 gigatons of carbon, sixty 
percent of which is attributable to tropical deforestation in the past 
 
 2. SIR NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 171 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.   
Deforestation is the second largest cause of greenhouse gas emissions in the world.  Daniel 
Howden, Destruction of Rainforest Accelerates Despite Outcry, INDEP., Jan. 18, 2008, available 
at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/green-living/destruction-of-rainforest-accelerates 
-despite-outcry-770904.html. 
 3. William F. Laurence, A New Initiative to Use Carbon Trading for Tropical Forest 
Conservation, 39 BIOTROPICA 20, 21 (2007). 
 4. See Dan Shapely, Corals and Forests: Climate Fix or Consensus Foe? Friday’s Roundup 
of News from the U.N. Global Warming Summit in Bali, THE DAILY GREEN, Dec. 7, 2007, 
http:// www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/coral-forest-climate-47120706; Mark 
Kinver, Forests ‘facing a testing time’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
science/nature/7942237.stm. 
 5. See National Association of Forest Industries, Australian Forest Industries Delegation 
at Poznan Climate Change Negotiations, 1–12 December 2008, available at http:// 
www.nafi.com.au/userfiles/briefing/Update%20on%20UNFCCC%20forest%20delegation.pdf; 
Anup Shah, COP14 – Poznan Climate Conference, GLOBAL ISSUES, Jan. 1, 2009, http:// 
www.globalissues.org/article/771/cop14-poznan-climate-conference. 
 6. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3. 
 7. The 15th COP meeting, which addressed goals and strategies for Kyoto’s successor, was 
held in Copenhagen, Denmark on December 7–18 2009.  See generally COP15 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference Copenhagen 2009, http://en.cop15.dk/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2009). 
 8. An incentive mechanism to reduce deforestation in developing countries also is 
important because it would likely goad U.S. participation in future international climate change 
negotiations.  See Laurence, supra note 3, at 23.  One of the principal concerns that kept the 
U.S. out of Kyoto was the Protocol’s failure to address increasing carbon emissions from 
developing countries.  Id. 
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half century.9  During the 1980s, tropical deforestation accounted for 
more than ninety percent of carbon dioxide emissions from 
deforestation.10  In 2007, the deforestation rate of the Amazon in 
Brazil nearly quadrupled for the months of August through 
December, with monthly numbers increasing from 234 square 
kilometers in August to 948 square kilometers in December.11  In 
2008, Brazil’s National Institute of Space Research reported that 
newly deforested areas in the Amazon comprised 1124 square 
kilometers in April, 1096 square kilometers in May, and 870 square 
kilometers in June.12  Tropical deforestation in Indonesia is even more 
staggering, with rates in excess of one million hectares per year as of 
this writing.13 
Tropical deforestation is a multi-faceted threat to the 
international climate change crisis.  In addition to releasing stored 
carbon, it reduces the remaining forests’ capacity to absorb carbon 
from the atmosphere.14  Furthermore, the loss of tropical forests will 
have significant effects on our planet’s natural climate stabilizers.  For 
example, the Amazon rainforest alone emits approximately seven 
trillion tons of water per year into the atmosphere, which ultimately 
turns into water vapor.15  This water vapor has a significant cooling 
effect on global climate patterns.16 
 
 9. DAVID HUNTER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 637 
(Foundation Press 2007).   
 10. Id. at 637–38. 
 11. Michael Kepp, Recent Jump in Amazon Deforestation Rates Prompts Brazil to Adopt 
Emergency Measures, 31 INT’L ENV’T REP. 113, 113 (2008). 
 12. Port of Entry, Brazil: Deforestation in the Amazon Dropped 62.8% in July (Sept. 2, 
2008), http://www.portofentry.com/site/root/resources/industry_news/6954.html.  In 2007, the 
World Wildlife Fund published a report that predicts that the Amazon could be essentially 
decimated by 2030.  WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, Amazon – World’s Largest Tropical Rain Forest 
and River Basin, http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/wherewework/amazon/index.html (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2009). 
 13. FOREST INVENTORY AND MAPPING CENTRE: MINISTRY OF FORESTRY, MONITORING 
OF DEFORESTATION RATE IN INDONESIA: ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION, available at 
http://www.dephut.go.id/informasi/unff/COP%2013/Model%20no%203%20utk%20email.pdf. 
With approximately 120 million hectares, Indonesia ranks third in the world in rainforest area 
after Brazil and the Congo.  Carbon Absorbing Tropical Forests a Potential Goldmine, CARBON 
OFFSETS DAILY, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.carbonoffsetsdaily.com/top-stories/carbon-
absorbing-tropical-forests-a-potential-gold-mine-4797.htm. 
 14. See HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 9, at 631. 
 15. PAULO MOUTINHO ET AL., Introduction, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 7, 8–9 (Paulo Moutino & Stephen Schwartzman eds., 2005). 
 16. See id. at 9. 
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Under the Kyoto Protocol,17 countries that are undergoing or are 
susceptible to engaging in large-scale deforestation have no incentive 
to curb these emissions.18  At present, the market drivers of 
deforestation19 are simply more profitable for developing nations20 
than forest conservation.21  In the absence of a carbon crediting 
scheme for developing tropical nations to earn tradable carbon 
credits for reducing deforestation, there is little financial incentive for 
these nations to reduce their deforestation practices.22  Furthermore, 
even if a plan is adopted offering nations financial incentive to 
decrease deforestation, certain nations with low deforestation rates 
still have little if any incentive to decrease deforestation due to the 
methodology used for crediting tradable carbon credits.23 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),24 
which allows Annex I nations25 to meet their Kyoto emissions limits 
by investing in emissions reductions projects in developing countries, 
currently offers no tradable credits to Annex I countries’ projects that 
credit tropical nations for reducing deforestation.26  Consequently, the 
 
 17. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1. 
 18. MOUTINHO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 47–48. 
 19. The market drivers of deforestation in developing nations include forces more subtle 
than logging and “slash and burn” activities.  According to a 2007 report from the Center for 
International Forestry Research, “[f]orces such as fluctuations in internal commodity process; 
agricultural and., more recently, biofuel subsidies; and roads and other infrastructure projects 
can encourage forest clearing.”  New Report on Deforestation Reveals Problems of Forest 
Carbon Payment Systems, ENVTL NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 7, 2007,  http://www.enn.com/ 
wildlife/article/26764.  See also Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable Consumption Governance in 
the Amazon, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10873–76 (2008) (discussing cattle, soybeans, and biofuels 
as the commodity drivers of deforestation in the Amazon). 
 20. This article focuses on tropical developing nations and, therefore, all references to 
“developing nations” refer to tropical developing nations. 
 21. See Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca et al., No Forest Left Behind, 5 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI. 
BIOLOGY 1645, 1645 (2007), available at http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/1545-
7885/5/8/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0050216-L.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12. 
 25. An Annex 1 nation is an “industrialized” country that has agreed to reduce its 
emissions below its 1990 levels as a party of the Kyoto Protocol., whereas Annex 2 nations were 
considered developing countries at the time of the agreement in 1992. The following are 
classified as Annex 1 countries: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States.  Mumma & 
Hodas, supra note 1, at 650. 
 26. See MOUTINHO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 49. 
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international community is failing to capitalize on the international 
carbon market, which is a potentially valuable weapon for developing 
and developed nations seeking to reduce carbon emissions in the fight 
against climate change. 
The prevailing scientific consensus today is that to avoid 
“dangerous” impacts from climate change, the Earth’s average 
temperature should not rise more than two degrees Centigrade.27  To 
achieve this goal, Annex I nations must significantly curb their 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.28  However, emissions reductions 
from Annex I nations alone will not be sufficient to prevent a greater 
than two degree Centigrade increase in temperature.  The Stern 
Review determined that even if emissions from developed nations are 
reduced to zero by 2050, the developing world would still have to 
reduce emissions by at least forty percent from baseline rates to 
stabilize global atmospheric carbon enough to prevent a greater than 
two degree Centigrade increase in the Earth’s average temperature.29  
Even though offering developing nations an incentive to curb 
deforestation rates is not a panacea to the global climate change 
problem, it is a significant step toward achieving net emissions 
reductions in the developing world. 
Part I of this article examines how the Kyoto Protocol currently 
incorporates forestry projects as a tool to combat climate change and 
how those efforts can be improved to more fully embrace carbon 
markets as a mechanism to credit efforts to curb tropical 
deforestation.  Part II evaluates four potential impediments to 
crediting efforts to curb deforestation: additionality, leakage, 
permanence, and monitoring.  Part III discusses the compensated 
reductions plan and the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre proposal, two existing proposals to credit developing nations 
for reducing emissions from tropical deforestation.  Part IV proposes 
the Hybrid Compensated Reductions and Preventive Credits plan to 
credit developing nations for reducing emissions from tropical 
 
 27. A 2° Centigrade increase in global average temperature would still result in significant 
adverse impact to climates in certain areas of the world.  So, while a 2° Centigrade increase 
would not be a “safe” increase in global average temperature, it is a good baseline goal from 
which a mitigation policy to combat climate change can be developed. See generally Malte 
Meinshausen, What Does a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief 
Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty 
Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 265 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et 
al. eds., 2006). 
 28. See STERN, supra note 2, at 206. 
 29. Id. 
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deforestation.  This proposal combines concepts from the 
compensated reductions plan and the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre proposals.  The hybrid plan offers developing 
nations an incentive to curb tropical deforestation rates by providing 
the necessary financial support, through enabling carbon credit 
trading, to execute and maintain these reductions. The hybrid plan 
would also require nations to account for forests at the national level 
rather than the project level, and would provide an incentive for 
nations with high proportions of remaining forest cover and low 
deforestation rates to prevent increases in their domestic 
deforestation rate. 
I.  CARBON TRADING AND DEFORESTATION 
The international carbon market is quickly emerging as a major 
force in emissions reduction compliance.30  The carbon trading market 
enables entities that wish to exceed their predetermined allotment of 
carbon dioxide emissions to purchase credits from another entity that 
has not exhausted its predetermined quota.31  This administrative 
mechanism ensures that only a certain amount of carbon dioxide will 
be released into the atmosphere and allows the entities to trade and 
negotiate to remain in compliance.32  This practice promotes flexibility 
and is a cheap and relatively easy method to ensure regulatory 
compliance.33  It also provides economic benefits to those entities that 
are able to remain within their allotment.  This process of buying and 
selling is known as carbon trading. 
The current carbon market has two principal methods for 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.34  The first is a cap and 
trade system.  Under this system, a regulated source’s GHG emissions 
are capped by a regulatory body.35  Sources whose emissions are 
below permitted levels can sell the unused emissions on the carbon 
 
 30. Trade in carbon credits increased approximately eighty percent from 2006 to 2007. 
Timothy Gardner, Global Carbon Trade Rose 80 Percent Last Year, REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2008, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUKN1832831820080118.  The total value of 
the carbon market more than doubled its worth in 2008, to approximately $125 billion dollars.  
Press Release, Point Carbon, 4.9Gt CO2e Traded in 2008 – Up Massive 83% on Previous Year 
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.1036167. 
 31. Jessica Daly, Trading the Carbon Market, CNN, Sept. 1, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/09/01/carbon.trading.pv/index.html. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 44. 
 35. Id. 
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market.36  Likewise, a source whose emissions exceed its allowance 
can purchase carbon credits on the carbon market to comply with the 
regulatory cap.37 
The other method is an emissions offset program, where 
emissions offsets are generated from projects that take place outside 
of the regulated community.38  The emissions offsets created by such 
projects can be sold to entities seeking to comply with their 
commitments within the regulated community.39  This model is 
available under the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol, whereby Annex I 
nations can use this “flexibility mechanism” to comply with their 
capped emissions limits set by the treaty.40  The CDM has been 
implemented in a wide variety of projects throughout the developing 
world.41 
This section first considers the CDM’s objectives and procedures 
and examines how this flexible compliance mechanism in the Kyoto 
Protocol fails to provide an adequate incentive to curb deforestation 
in developing countries.  It then considers how crediting reduced 
emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD) in developing 
countries can help advance the international effort to combat climate 
change. 
A. The Clean Development Mechanism 
The Kyoto Protocol sets mandatory emissions reductions targets 
for Annex I countries that must be met by the end of the first 
commitment period of 2008-2012.42  To achieve this goal in a cost-
effective manner, Annex I nations are able to supplement a portion of 
their emission reduction requirements through three flexibility 
mechanisms: joint implementation (JI),43 the CDM, and international 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 44–45. 
 40. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46. 
 41. See id. at 52–53 (explaining that a variety of projects have been launched under the 
CDM including  renewable energy projects, energy efficiency projects, fuel switching, capping 
landfill gases, and controlling emissions of certain industrial gases). 
 42. Id. at 46. 
 43. Joint implementation (“JI”), defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, offers parties a 
cost effective way to comply with the Kyoto Protocol by allowing Annex I countries to earn 
emission reduction units (ERUs) from participation in an emission reduction project of another 
Annex 1 country.  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6. For a JI project to proceed, the 
Abate & Wright_final_cpcxns.doc 2/25/2010  3:08:17 PM 
94 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:87 
emissions trading.44  Under the CDM, Annex I countries can earn 
certified emission reductions (CERs) for financing projects that 
reduce emissions in developing countries that have no commitments 
under Kyoto.45  Annex I countries can use these CERs for compliance 
with their emissions targets.46 
Forestry projects now can earn tradable credits through the 
CDM and joint implementation, but such projects are limited to 
afforestation and reforestation.47  Afforestation and reforestation 
both refer to anthropogenic conversion of non-forested areas into 
forested land.48  The difference is that afforestation refers to projects 
on land that has not been forested for at least fifty years, while 
reforestation refers to the conversion of non-forested areas that have 
not been forested since December 31, 1989.49  These afforestation and 
reforestation credits are capped for use by Annex I parties at one 
percent of their base-year emissions or five percent of emissions 
during the entire five-year commitment period from 2008 to 2012.50 
The CDM is governed by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is supervised by the 
CDM Executive Board.51  The Conference of the Parties has declared 
that the triad of mechanisms (JI, CDM, and emissions trading) were 
intended to enable flexibility in compliance efforts but also were 
 
reduced emissions must exceed those that would have occurred without the project.  Id.  Annex 
I parties may not exclusively rely on JI credits to meet their targets.  Id. 
 44. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46. 
 45. Id. at 47. 
 46. Id.  As of this writing, there are more than 4200 projects in progress under the CDM, 
including 1873 registered projects and an additional 109 projects requesting registration.  See 
CDM Statistics, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2009). 
 47. See Bernhard Schlamadinger et al., Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation in 
the International Response to Climate Change?, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 53, 53 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005). 
 48. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra  note 1, at 643. 
 49. Id.  Some commentators have argued that many tropical forest species can survive in 
the “new growth” or “secondary forest” after the old forest areas have been cut.  Erik Stokstad, 
A Second Chance for Biodiversity, SCIENCE, June 13, 2008, at 1436.  However, regardless of re-
growth, there is a vital need to conserve the remaining old-growth tropical forests.  "Primary 
forest is even harder to replace than many researchers expect," says Toby Gardner of the 
Federal University of Lavras in Brazil.  Id.  "For many species, once these virgin forests have 
gone there is nowhere else to go."  Id.  Many species, such as the harlequin toad, require old-
growth forest habitat to survive.  Id. 
 50. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra  note 1, at 658. 
 51. MEINHARD DOELLE, FROM HOT AIR TO ACTION?  CLIMATE CHANGE, COMPLIANCE 
AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 29–34 (2005). 
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meant to supplement domestic actions.52  The CDM allows 
industrialized countries that are parties to Kyoto to invest in 
emission-reducing products of non-party developing countries.53  The 
purpose of this mechanism is to build relations between industrial and 
developing countries and encourage a sustainable environment by 
allowing industrialized countries to reduce carbon emissions at a 
lower cost.54  This mechanism also is beneficial in that it allows non-
party countries to become involved in the overall goal of reducing 
carbon emissions while enabling exposure to resources and 
technology that will encourage development of their own countries.  
Therefore, the CDM ultimately seeks to “bridge the political divide 
between developed and developing countries as their industries take 
action together.”55 
Nevertheless, the requirements of a CDM project are so 
stringent that the benefits are impossible for some applicants to 
obtain.56  The following issues must be considered for a CDM project: 
(1) project participants and other parties involved; (2) technologies 
used in the project; (3) baseline, validation, and verification 
methodologies; (4) location of the project and status of the host 
country authorization letter; (5) ownership of CER’s; (6) 
additionality; (7) environmental and/or community development 
benefits resulting from the project; (8) monitoring; and (9) a 
verification plan.57 
The strict requirements of the CDM process begin with a project 
design document submission to the Executive Board, a ten member 
panel which is part of the UNFCCC.58  This project design document 
contains a detailed description of the proposed project and how it will 
reduce GHG emissions.59  To gain approval, the project design 
 
 52. David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, 
and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W. N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 53 (2009). 
 53. Id. at 40. 
 54. See id. at 81. 
 55. Jack Cogen, Chief Exec. Officer, Natsource L.L.C., Why the US Needs Access to 
International & Domestic Carbon Markets, remarks at Carbon Markets Insights Americas 
Conference (Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.natsource.com/uploads/ 
news/Jack%20Cogen%20-%20CarbonForum%20LONG%20Remarks.doc.  
 56. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM: 2008 IN BRIEF 5–6 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
publications/08_cdm_in_brief.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 4–5. 
 58. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 49. 
 59. Id. 
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document must demonstrate that the proposed project actually 
creates emissions reductions that are “additional” to any reductions 
that would have occurred in a “business as usual” setting.60  The 
developing country that hosts this project must also write a letter of 
approval acknowledging the project.61  If the project is approved, or 
“registered,” the project is then implemented and monitored to 
ensure that there have been real emissions reductions.62  The GHG 
emissions reductions are analyzed and submitted for approval as 
CERs, which are issued for each ton of carbon dioxide reduced.63 
Despite its laudable intentions, the CDM is an ineffective tool 
for fighting tropical deforestation.  The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
has recently criticized the CDM, arguing that one in five carbon 
credits issued by the UNFCCC are going to projects that may have 
actually increased carbon emissions.64  WWF contends that the CDM 
is essentially funding projects that would have proceeded regardless 
of the CDM project, and, consequently, most CDM projects lack 
“additionality.”65  For example, the World Bank recently approved 
funding for a 4,000-megawatt coal plant in India that will emit 25.7 
million tons of carbon dioxide per year.66  Shockingly, Annex I 
nations will be able to invest in this proposed coal plant to earn 
tradable credits via the CDM, which will allow these nations to 
increase their carbon emissions domestically.67  The justification for 
this project is that it is deemed to be a “super-critical” coal-generating 
technology that will make this plant more efficient than others in 
 
 60. Id. at 49–50. 
 61. Id. at 50. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  For a discussion of the CDM process and recommendations to improve its 
efficiency, see generally Mindy Nigoff, The Clean Development Mechanism: Does the Current 
Structure Facilitate Kyoto Protocol Compliance?, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 249 (2006); 
Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008). 
 64. Michael Szabo, A Fifth of U.N. Carbon Credits May Be Bogus, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL2926519020071129?pageNumber 
=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true. 
 65. Id. 
 66. David Wheeler, Tata Ultra Mega Mistake: The IFC Should Not Get Burned by Coal, 
CARMA BLOG (Mar. 13, 2008), http://carma.org/blog/tata-ultra-mega-mistake-the-ifc-should-
not-get-burned-by-coal/. 
 67. See JUDSON JAFFE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, THE HARVARD PROJECT ON INT’L 
CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, LINKAGE OF TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE 12–19 (2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
StavinsWeb6.pdf. 
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India.68  However, many argue the end result of this project will result 
in no net reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, and will ultimately 
result in a net increase in carbon emissions, especially since the region 
of India that the plant will serve has a very outdated power grid to 
transport the electricity.69 
Another criticism of the CDM is that it is only available on the 
project level.70  Given the stringent requirements any CDM project 
faces in demonstrating that it will result in net emissions reductions, 
this project-level focus significantly limits the CDM’s scope of 
potential projects.71  One of the CDM’s most glaring weaknesses, 
however, is its failure to acknowledge projects in developing countries 
that reduce deforestation.  The Environmental Defense Fund argues 
that giving developing tropical nations market-based incentives for 
reducing national emissions from deforestation is one of the five 
necessary adjustments to make the CDM a practical tool in the fight 
against climate change.72  However, due to the criticisms noted above, 
the CDM’s overall structure, and its controversial negotiations in the 
Marrakesh Accords,73 the CDM is not an effective mechanism for 
reducing emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD).74  
Thus, an alternative approach must be developed to address this 
growing international crisis. 
B. Reduced Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol established targets and timetables 
for emissions reductions and flexibility mechanisms to help nations 
meet their prescribed targets.75  Along with the CDM, JI, and 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See JOS COZIJNSEN ET AL., CDM AND THE POST-2012 FRAMEWORK 6 (Envtl Defense 
Fund, 2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6838_ED_Vienna_CDM%20Paper_ 
8_22_07.pdf. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 7. 
 73. THE MARRAKESH ACCORDS AND THE MARRAKESH DECLARATION, available at 
http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf  (2001).  For additional discussion of these 
controversial negotiations, see infra Part IV.C. 
 74. See Rogerio F. Pinto & Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira, Implementation Challenges 
in Protecting the Global Environmental Commons: The Case of Climate Change Policies in 
Brazil, 28 PUBLIC ADMIN. DEV. 340, 346–47 (discussing how CDM projects in Brazil have 
clashed with local interests and values). 
 75. See ERIN C. MYERS MADEIRA, REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND 
DEGRADATION (REDD) IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
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emissions trading, a fourth mechanism—REDD—was proposed.76  
This option was deemed to have the potential to contribute the 
greatest and most immediate carbon stock impact.77  Furthermore, 
since REDD encourages the abatement of deforestation, it would not 
only reduce carbon emissions but also would assist in sustainable 
development benefits such as biodiversity conservation;78 watershed 
protection; reduction of runoff, siltation, and flooding; protection of 
fisheries; and sustained incomes for local communities.79 
After this mechanism was established, research concluded that 
REDD activities could not be isolated and, thus, that the 
mechanism’s specific effects could not be determined.80  Moreover, 
there was significant disagreement regarding how REDD could meet 
these target emission rates.  The Seventh Conference of the Parties 
(COP 7)81 determined there were various uncertainties about the 
actual rate of deforestation emissions and the ability to monitor such 
rates.82  Consequently, REDD projects have been excluded from 
 
FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 8 (2008), 
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-REDD_final.2.20.09.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Id. at 14. 
 78. Due to the thousands of acres of rainforest destroyed or severely degraded each year, 
several hundred species are driven to extinction, the majority of which are never documented by 
science. Sustainable Amazon, BRAZILIAN EMBASSY – WASHINGTON D.C., June 17, 2007, 
http://www.brasilemb.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=111.  
Moreover, there are more than one million species of animals in the Amazon. Into the Depths 
of the Amazon–Fauna, http://library.thinkquest.org/21395/textonly/fauna/ (last visited Dec. 28, 
2009). Scientists have documented that the Amazon is the home to jaguars, harpy eagles, 
dolphins, manatees, sloths, and monkeys.  It also hosts 950 bird species, 3000 freshwater fish 
species, 5000 species of trees, and the largest diversity of butterflies.  Sustainable Amazon, 
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY – WASHINGTON D.C., June 17, 2007, http://www.brasilemb.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=111.  In addition to the impressive 
array of animal life in the Amazon, a reported 1300 medicinal species can be found in this great 
forest, creating a “natural medicine chest.”  Antibiotics, narcotics, abortive drugs, 
contraceptives, anticoagulants, fungicides, anesthetics, muscular relaxants, and anti-diarrheal 
and anti-viral medications are developed from these species.  Id.  Moreover, only 90 of the 1,300 
medicinal species are commercially exploited by the pharmaceutical industry, again illustrating 
how invaluable these rainforests are, and how much we have to learn about them.  Id. 
 79. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 26. 
 80. Id. at 22. 
 81. U.N Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Dec. 28, 2009) (“The detailed rules 
for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are 
called the ‘Marrakesh Accords.’”). 
 82. Annie Petsonk, Rewarding Reductions, Realizing Results: Legal Options for Making 
Compensated Reductions a Reality, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 119, 
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regulatory markets and are limited to the voluntary carbon market.83  
Voluntary carbon markets are utilized by buyers who are more 
interested in reducing their environmental impact or improving their 
environmental image, as opposed to remaining in compliance with a 
law or regulation.84  In a voluntary market, credits are sold at a 
fraction of the price of credits sold in regulatory markets.85 
Spurred by efforts of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations,86 the 
2005 COP 11 proposed to offer developing countries access to the 
carbon market through credits generated from REDD activities.87  
The UNFCC later instituted a two-year experimental period to 
examine the possible benefits of REDD.88  In 2008, the World Bank 
announced the countries that will participate in this preliminary 
exhibition of REDD.89 
In 2007, at COP 13 in Bali, REDD was again listed among the 
possible mitigation methods to achieve emissions targets.90  The 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is researching the building 
capacity for REDD in developing countries as well as testing a 
performance-based payment program to lay a foundation of positive 
incentives and financing in the future.91  The negotiations at COP 14 
in Pozna  in 2008 also included a thorough consideration and 
endorsement of REDD.92  In December 2009, REDD was revisited at 
 
121 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf. 
 83. See id. at 28. 
 84. See generally id.19–20 (discussing application of voluntary carbon markets to countries 
not parties to Kyoto treaty). 
 85. See id. at 27. 
 86. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations consists of more than forty developing nations 
that support the use of carbon credits to curb tropical deforestation.  See generally Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations, http://www.rainforestcoalition.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2009). 
 87. Tropical Forest Group, A History of Climate Change and Tropical Forest Negotiations 
(Aug. 2007), http://www.tropicalforestgroup.org/articles/history.html (“At COP 11 in 2005, the 
idea of saving forests to prevent GHG emissions got a new title- REDD.”). 
 88. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 27. 
 89. Id. at 28.  These countries include nations in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Madagascar), Latin America (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, 
Mexico, and Panama), and Asia (Nepal, Lao PDR, and Vietnam).  These pilot countries will 
establish baseline emissions, exemplify monitoring strategies, and provide a glimpse of REDD 
in action overall to be used as a foundation for future implementation.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 27. 
 91. Id. at 28. 
 92. See Richard Horsch, Poznan:  Progress or Procrastination?, 11 INT’L ENVTL. L. NEWS 
1, 3–5 (2009) (noting that there was consensus at Pozna  that REDD should be an important 
component of the post-Kyoto framework). 
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COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark.93 REDD proposals were discussed 
extensively at COP 15 and language was incorporated into the 
Copenhagen Accord recognizing the importance of REDD and the 
need to establish a financing mechanism for it.94 As of this writing, 
however, developing countries remain ineligible to earn tradable 
carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol for curbing deforestation. 
The many proposed benefits of REDD projects have been 
diluted by an array of criticisms including methodological concerns, 
indigenous peoples’ concerns,95 and environmental groups’ concerns.  
Some of the leading methodological concerns were (1) leakage,96 (2) 
enforceability,97 (3) feasibility and accuracy of monitoring and control, 
 
 93. See Norton Rose, United Nations Climate Change Conference, http:// 
www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2009/pub19337.aspx?page=all&lang=en-gb (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2009). 
      94  See Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, arts. 6, 8 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
 95. While beyond the scope of this Article, a thorough evaluation of potential impacts to 
indigenous peoples is indispensable for REDD to be successfully implemented into a post-
Kyoto regime.  Tropical rainforests are not only a home to these peoples, but also offer a way of 
life.  They serve a cultural and spiritual purpose, in addition to providing food, medicines, and 
shelter.  However, as logging and predation continue, the land they call home is being 
threatened. Indigenous peoples have relied on and co-existed with the resources of the 
rainforest for decades.  International Expert Group Meeting on Indigenous Peoples and 
Climate Change (April 3, 2008) (conference paper available at United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Peoples Document Library), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/EGM_A42.html.  While they have learned to use 
rainforest resources in an efficient and sustainable way, contributing very little to mankind’s 
ecological footprints on Earth, indigenous peoples nonetheless are positioned on the front lines 
to endure the greatest impacts from climate change and deforestation.  Id.  According to the 
anthropologist Darcy Riberio, “55 indigenous populations vanished in the first half of the 20th 
century.”  GREENPEACE, BRIEFING: DENI DEMARCATION 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/deni-demarcation-the-
demarcat.pdf.  Since there is such a delicate relationship of reliance and coexistence, drastic 
changes in these pristine forests severely affect all aspects of life for the indigenous peoples who 
live there.  Deforestation is also forcing indigenous people to migrate to cities, which leaves 
these individuals in urban slums with limited opportunities for adaptation to an entirely foreign 
way of life. Press Release, United Nations University, Indigenous People Hardest Hit by 
Climate Change Describe Impacts (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with United Nations University). 
Indigenous people are often the victims of human right violations, displacements, and conflicts 
due to “expropriation of ancestral lands and forests for biofuel plantations (soya, sugar-cane, 
jatropha, oil-palm, corn, etc.), as well as for carbon sink and renewable energy projects 
(hydropower dams, geothermal plants).”  Id.  These actions occur “without the free, prior and 
informed consent of [these] people.”  Id. 
 96. See infra Part II.B. 
 97. See Roger Harrabin, Forest Plan may “Fuel Corruption,” BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/7669215.stm (“We should not underestimate the scale of 
challenge faced in some forest nations where governance is virtually non-existent.”); New 
Report on Deforestation, supra note 19 (“[R]educing carbon emissions from forests will require 
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(4) natural and anthropogenic disturbances, (5) baseline setting, and 
(6) additionality.98  A major concern of indigenous peoples regarding 
REDD projects was forest property rights.  This concern was borne 
from experiences in which payment for carbon services benefit 
corrupt officials or local elites, which ultimately harms the individual 
communities that make their homes in these forests.99  Finally, 
environmental groups opposed the notion that wealthy nations could 
try to circumvent their obligations to reduce emissions under Kyoto 
by simply investing in REDD projects.100  They feared that these 
wealthy nations would use REDD projects as a loophole to “buy their 
way out” of making permanent emissions reductions at home.101  
There also was a concern that investing in REDD projects could 
decrease investment in energy abatement technology, which 
prompted environmental groups, and consequently many 
governments, to disfavor avoided deforestation crediting.102 
Despite these concerns, REDD continues to be accepted in 
principle and implemented outside the Kyoto compliance regime.  In 
September 2008, the UN-REDD Programme was launched, which is a 
collaboration between the UN Environment Programme, the UN 
Food and Agricultural Organization, and the UN Development 
Programme.103  A pilot project under the UN-REDD Programme was 
announced in March 2009 in which the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, and Vietnam will 
receive $18 million to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and 
support indigenous peoples’ interests in the forests.104  Bolivia, 
Panama, Paraguay, and Zambia also have sought funding from the 
UN-REDD Programme.105 
 
strengthening the weak governance mechanisms that have long proven unable to enforce many 
existing prohibitions on forest clearing.”). 
 98. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 29. 
 99. See id; New Report on Deforestation, supra note 19 (“Deeply ingrained and routinely 
corrupt government practices often favor large corporate interests over community rights to 
forest resources.”). 
 100. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 29. 
 101. See Laurence, supra note 3, at 20, 23. 
 102. Roger A. Sedjo & Brent Sohngen, Carbon Credits for Avoided Deforestation 1 
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 2007), available at http:// 
www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-07-47.pdf. 
 103. UN scheme provides $18 million to five countries to slash emissions, create jobs, UN 
NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
30221&Cr=deforestation&Cr1. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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II.  CHALLENGES IN CREDITING REDD PROJECTS 
Whenever a plan to award tradable carbon credits to a 
developing country for REDD activities is considered, four issues are 
typically raised: monitoring, leakage, additionality, and 
permanence.106  Any effective plan to credit REDD activities must 
address these four issues.  While monitoring can be addressed 
independently, leakage, additionality, and permanence are often 
interdependent, and any effective REDD crediting scheme must 
effectively balance these three issues.107 
A.  Monitoring 
The ability to quantify and verify tropical deforestation is 
essential to any REDD crediting scheme.108  Satellite data is the best 
available option to measure deforestation rates to set baselines and 
track deforestation after baselines have been set.109  The problem with 
satellite monitoring is not a lack of scientific accuracy; rather, it stems 
from developing countries lacking the financial and technological 
resources necessary to conduct this type of monitoring.110  As of 2006, 
Brazil and India were the only developing nations with the necessary 
infrastructure to monitor their forests via satellite.111 
An effective forest monitoring system must cover a vast expanse 
of forest area repeatedly to effectively track deforestation rates.112  
Along with satellite imagery, actual field verification is necessary to 
validate the accuracy of satellite imagery.113  However, field 
verification is only feasible in a limited number of areas.  For larger 
 
 106. See Marcio Santilli et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: An Editorial 
Essay, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 47, 49–50 (Paulo Moutinho & 
Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005) (explaining the nature of these four issues and how they relate 
to crediting reductions in tropical deforestation). 
 107. See id. 
 108. R. DeFries et al., Monitoring Tropical Deforestation for Emerging Carbon Markets, in 
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 35, 35 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan 
Schwartzman eds., 2005), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_ 
TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (explaining that most tropical nations do not currently have the capabilities to 
effectively monitor their rainforests in order to carry out a compensated reduction scheme that 
shares the same monitoring methods as the hybrid plan). 
 112. Id.  The hybrid plan operates on the national level; therefore, it is necessary for a 
monitoring system to be capable of overseeing an entire nation’s tropical forests. 
 113. Id. (explaining that this is essential to verify that there is no discrepancy between the 
satellite imagery and the actual forest degradation on the ground). 
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expanses of forest, overflights and extremely high resolution imagery 
is necessary due to lack of access by land.114  In reality, no one method 
of monitoring can be effective for monitoring all tropical forests; 
therefore, different methods must be adopted to effectively monitor 
different forests.115 
Another issue in monitoring is determining what constitutes 
“deforestation.”116  Experts suggest that two factors must be 
established when analyzing deforestation.  First, a monitoring system 
must identify what forest degradation is to be monitored (e.g., 
selective logging, clear-cut logging, slash and burn tactics, land 
conversion, etc.).117  Second, a monitoring system must set forth the 
minimum disturbance size that will register on the monitoring scale.118 
B. Leakage 
Leakage is the concept that if deforestation is halted in one 
project area, the market demands will simply shift deforestation to 
another unregulated area, thus nullifying the benefit of emissions 
reductions in the project area.119  Leakage has been a vexing problem 
for the CDM.120  Because the CDM operates at the project level 
instead of the national level, the concern is that deforestation will 
simply move to another area outside of the project area within the 
host country.121 
Leakage also presents a problem for forestry projects that 
operate on the national level.  Even if a REDD scheme is 
implemented at the national level, there is still potential for 
international leakage, as the market drivers of deforestation may 
simply shift borders to a neighboring nation that does not participate 
in a REDD crediting scheme.122  For example, one commentator has 
 
 114. R. DeFries et al., supra note 108, at 40. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  The IPCC report on Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry includes multiple 
definitions of what constitutes “deforestation.” The clearest definition is “permanent removal of 
forest cover,” and “forest” is considered to be land covered by more than ten percent tree cover. 
Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  (“[T]he minimum size would depend on the types of forest disturbances included 
and the feasibility of accurate detection by available satellite sensors.”). 
 119. Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 6. 
 120. See Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 49. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See G.A. Silvia-Chavez, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Tropical 
Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to Bolivia, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION 
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posed a hypothetical scenario in which Brazil adopts a REDD 
crediting scheme and neighboring Bolivia does not.123  Under these 
circumstances, the market drivers of deforestation would simply jump 
the border to Bolivia to bypass Brazilian conservation laws.124  
Because any REDD scheme is likely to be voluntary for developing 
tropical nations, there may be many opportunities for cross-boundary 
international leakage.125 
C.  Additionality 
Additionality is the principle that if a project seeks to earn 
credits in a carbon market, it should create carbon reductions that 
would not have occurred in the absence of the financed project.126  
The CDM has very strict additionality requirements127 that have 
rendered the CDM ineffective.128  Under the CDM, additionality 
often presents a technical challenge for forestry projects because the 
strict criteria make it difficult to identify whether a forestry project’s 
emissions reductions would have occurred in the absence of the 
proposed project.129 
Although the CDM currently involves only afforestation and 
reforestation projects, the same problem occurs when crediting 
reductions in deforestation.  Because any REDD crediting scheme 
requires the credit accounting baselines to be set according to historic 
deforestation rates,130 it is impossible to predict with complete 
accuracy whether deforestation will occur in a particular nation at the 
same or higher rate in the future.  Thus, it is impossible to state that a 
nation’s decreased deforestation over a commitment period was 
solely attributable to its participation in the REDD crediting scheme.  
 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 73, 84 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), available 
at http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ ClimateChange.pdf. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 7. 
 126. See T.C. Heller, Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political Economy of 
Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
203, 211 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999). 
 127. See generally Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46–51 (describing the CDM and its 
current function within the Kyoto Protocol). 
 128. Andrew W. Mitchell et al., Forests NOW in the Fight Against Climate Change 13 
(Forest Foresight Report 1.v3 2008) (arguing the CDM’s burdensome certification requirements 
and high transaction costs have resulted in less than one percent of carbon market investments 
in reforestation projects, and not one fully commercial project has been approved to date). 
 129. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra note 1, at 670. 
 130. Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 49. 
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There is always the possibility that the decreases in tropical 
deforestation were attributable to some other source.  As discussed in 
Part IV of this Article, addressing both additionally and leakage on 
the international level can be problematic. 
D.  Permanence 
The issue of permanence speaks to the security of emissions 
offsets.131  One major question regarding permanence is whether 
avoided deforestation at one time will continue to be avoided in the 
future.132  One of the reasons deforestation projects were not included 
in the CDM is that some feared carbon sequestered in a forest project 
would be released to the atmosphere at a future date due to natural 
or human disturbances, such as fire and future deforestation.133  This 
concern prompted the flawed argument that protection of carbon 
stocks at one point may lead to greater emissions from these carbon 
stocks in the future.134  Because of the purported ephemeral nature of 
conserved forest, current carbon markets such as the CDM issue 
temporary credits for forestry projects, which eventually expire after 
a set number of years and must be repurchased.135  This system has 
left many potential investors wary.136 
III. EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS TO CREDIT REDD PROJECTS 
Initial proposals to include deforestation in the Kyoto Protocol 
were shunned.137  Nevertheless, the potential benefits from 
implementing a REDD scheme prompted several new proposals for 
successful application of REDD.  The two leading proposals to credit 
decreases in deforestation are (1) The Compensated Reductions Plan 
and (2) The European Commission Joint Research Centre Proposal.  
This section analyzes these proposals and concludes that each 
proposal is hampered by significant limitations. 
 
 131. Id. at 50. 
 132. Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 6. 
 133. See Schlamadinger et al., supra note 47, at 55. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Mitchell et al., supra note 128, at 32. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Laurence, supra note 3, at 20. 
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A.  Compensated Reductions Plan 
The most widely regarded proposal138 for tackling tropical 
deforestation is the Compensated Reductions Plan.139  Created by 
NGO and academic experts, this proposal gained support in the 
international community due to the Coalition of Rainforest Nations’ 
lobbying efforts at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005.140  As a result, at COP 
11, a team was assembled to prepare and submit a proposal to the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to study the 
potential benefits of reducing emissions from deforestation.141 
The proposed compensated reductions plan awards tradable 
carbon credits to tropical nations for reducing their emissions from 
deforestation.142  Under the compensated reductions proposal, 
developing nations voluntarily elect to reduce their national emissions 
from deforestation over a span of years.143  A nation’s reductions are 
then compared against a national baseline, which is calculated by 
averaging that nation’s annual deforestation rate over a period of 
time.144  A nation that successfully reduces its deforestation from the 
historic baseline during the commitment period receives carbon 
certificates similar to CERs under the CDM, which may be sold to 
governments or private investors.145  Although the decision to 
participate is voluntary, a nation that receives carbon certificates is 
deemed to have entered into a binding agreement not to increase 
deforestation in future comment periods.146 
With regard to the additionality issue, the proponents of 
compensated reductions assert that tropical deforestation is 
increasing internationally, with increases occurring at alarming rates 
in certain areas.147  Therefore, it is easy to demonstrate that sustained 
reductions in deforestation would not occur in the absence of 
 
 138. Moutinho & Schwartzman, supra note 15, at 9. 
 139. See generally Santilli et al., supra note 18, at 47–49 (discussing how compensated 
reduction can both reduce substantial carbon emissions from deforestation and encourage 
developing countries to participate in the Kyoto Protocol framework). 
 140. Laurence, supra note 3, at 21. 
 141. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 68. 
 142. Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 48–49. 
 143. Id.  The initial proposal was for the reductions to occur during the first commitment 
period under Kyoto. Id. 
 144. Id. at 49. 
 145. Id. at 48–49. 
 146. See id. at 49. 
 147. See id. at 49–50. 
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compensated reductions.148  The logic follows that any reduction in 
deforestation rates will be “additional” in that it would not occur in 
the absence of the compensated reductions plan, as it is very unlikely 
that deforestation rates at either the national or international levels 
will decrease without implementing a crediting scheme such as 
compensated reductions. 
As for the permanence issue, the drafters argue that the 
permanence of carbon credits will be assured by the stipulation that 
nations that receive tradable carbon credits in one period, and then 
increase deforestation in the next commitment period, will have to 
mitigate any increased deforestation as a prerequisite to earning 
future carbon credits.149  The compensated reductions plan also 
proposes a system of “banking” carbon credits, whereby a portion of 
the earned reductions credits are tradable upon receipt, while another 
portion of the credits are “banked” and are unable to be traded until 
a future commitment period.150  The goal of banking credits is to 
ensure actual emissions offsets.151 
One of the main advantages of the compensated reductions 
proposal is its ability to account for leakage at the national level.  
Unlike project-based systems such as the CDM, accounting for 
deforestation at the national level prevents a nation from receiving 
carbon credits by reducing deforestation in one region of the country 
while simultaneously increasing deforestation in another region of the 
country.152  This national level system does not completely cure the 
problem of leakage, however, and may create an entirely different 
leakage problem: international leakage.153 
The compensated reductions proponents maintain that 
international leakage is a much larger problem under current Kyoto 
rules.154  They contend that because Annex I nations are able to earn 
credit for maintaining their forest stands at home, the demand for 
tropical timber increases as a result.155  Thus, by offering developing 
 
 148. See Santilli et al., supra note 106 (arguing that this state of affairs remains true despite 
the prediction that deforestation rates will eventually level off and slow as tropical forests 
disappear). 
 149. See id. at 48–49. 
 150. See id. at 50. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 49. 
 153. See id.  For a discussion of leakage, see generally supra notes 119–125 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. See Santilli et al., supra note 106. 
 155. See id. 
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tropical nations an incentive to reduce their emissions from 
deforestation, Annex I nations will begin to combat the problem of 
international leakage by limiting the restrictive influence of the 
tropical timber market on developing nations outside of Annex I.156  
Moreover, they argue that international leakage will be a problem 
only if few nations elect to participate in compensated reductions.157 
There is a small group of tropical nations that likely would not 
participate in compensated reductions, and these are the nations with 
high remaining forest cover and low rates of deforestation (HFLD 
nations).158  Because HFLD nations have little incentive to participate 
in a compensated reductions scheme, these nations will presumably 
face significant pressures from the market drivers of deforestation 
once other tropical nations begin earning tradable REDD credits.159  
A 2007 study suggested that tropical nations should be divided into 
four different categories according to tropical forest cover and 
deforestation rate.160  The following table illustrates this 
categorization.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156. See id. at 50. 
 157. See id. at 49 (arguing that the theoretical timber market shift from Brazil to Bolivia, 
which would presumably occur if only Brazil adopted compensated reductions in South 
America, would not occur if Bolivia also adopted compensated reductions). 
 158. “HFLD” nations include Panama, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, 
Belize, French Guiana, Gabon, Guyana, Suriname, Bhutan and Zambia. See da Fonseca et al., 
supra note 21, at 1645. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. This table is a modified version of “Figure 1” found in da Fonseca et al., supra note 21, 
at 1645. 
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 Low Forest Cover 
(<50%) 
High Forest Cover 
(>50%) 
High Deforestation Rate 
(>0.22%/yr) 
Quadrant I 
 
E.g., Guatemala, 
Thailand, Madagasgar 
 
High potential for 
REDD credits 
 
High potential for 
reforestation payments 
under CDM 
Quadrant III 
 
E.g., Papua New 
Guinea, Brazil 
 
High Potential for 
REDD credits 
 
Low potential for 
reforestation payments 
under CDM 
Low Deforestation Rate 
(<0.22%/yr) 
Quadrant II 
 
E.g., Dominican 
Republic, Angola, 
Vietnam 
 
Low potential for 
REDD credits 
 
High potential for 
reforestation payments 
under CDM 
Quadrant IV – HFLD 
Nations 
 
E.g., Suriname, Gabon, 
Belize 
 
Low potential for 
REDD credits 
 
Low potential for 
reforestation payments 
under CDM 
 
According to the aforementioned study, Quadrant I nations are 
those with less than fifty percent of their original forest cover 
remaining and a high current deforestation rate (i.e., greater than a 
0.22% yearly average).162 Quadrant I nations have high potential to 
earn credits for reducing deforestation under a framework such as 
compensated reductions.163  These nations also have high potential to 
earn credits under the CDM through reforestation projects.164  
Quadrant II nations are those nations with less than fifty percent of 
their original forest cover and a low deforestation rate.165  These 
nations have little potential to earn substantial credits under the 
compensated reductions plan, but a high potential for earning 
reforestation credits under the CDM.166  However, as noted in Part I 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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of this article, the CDM is an ineffective solution to the tropical 
deforestation crisis.167 
Quadrant III nations are those with more than fifty percent of 
their original forest cover remaining and a high deforestation rate 
(greater than 0.22% of national forest cover deforested per year).168  
Brazil is an example of a Quadrant III nation.169  According to the 
study, Quadrant III nations have a high potential to earn credits 
under the compensated reductions framework, and a low potential for 
reforestation payments under the CDM.170  It seems, however, that 
this CDM analysis is too broadly construed because a nation the size 
of Brazil could earn significant credits under the CDM if the CDM 
were a viable mechanism for large-scale carbon credit distribution.171 
Finally, Quadrant IV nations, which represent the HFLD 
nations, have more than fifty percent of their original forest cover 
remaining and a low deforestation rate.172  Quadrant IV nations have 
little potential to earn tradable credits in a system such as the 
compensated reductions plan that solely compensates based on 
reductions in deforestation.173  These nations also have little potential 
to earn reforestation credits under the CDM.174 
These HFLD nations represent eighteen percent of stored 
tropical forest carbon worldwide.175  Because these nations have little 
incentive under the proposed compensated reductions plan or the 
CDM to preserve their forests, HFLD nations are likely candidates 
for increased deforestation if a REDD crediting scheme is adopted 
that does not reward: (1) nations that have successfully conserved 
their forests thus far, or (2) nations that have been successful in 
recent years in curbing deforestation.176  The drivers of tropical 
deforestation are mobile, and international leakage is a serious threat 
to the effectiveness of any REDD crediting scheme.177  Therefore, it is 
important that any REDD scheme issue preventive credits to HFLD 
 
 167. See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally id. at 1645–46. 
 172. Id. at 1645. 
 173. See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See generally id. 
 177. Id. at 1645. 
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nations to ensure they have adequate incentive to maintain their 
forests in the face of increased pressure to harvest due to 
international leakage.178 
If the international reference emission rate is set at one-third of 
the global average deforestation, projections suggest that crediting at 
a modest $10 per ton of carbon dioxide reduced could be worth 
approximately $365 million annually for seven of the eleven HFLD 
nations.179  Setting the international reference emission rate at one-
half the global average deforestation would mean that ten HFLD 
nations could earn approximately $630 million dollars annually.180  If 
the global average rate is used as the baseline, all eleven HFLD 
nations could profit approximately $1.8 billion annually from 
preventive credits.181 
While issuing preventive credits to HFLD nations is an essential 
tool to combat international leakage, there are still some potential 
drawbacks. One argument is that issuing preventive credits may flood 
the carbon market with credits, thus lowering the overall price of the 
credits, which could diminish many nations’ incentives to reduce 
deforestation.182  However, when preventive credits are viewed in light 
of the percentage of forest carbon credits they represent, it is a small 
portion of the international market.183  Initial approximations suggest 
preventive credits will only account for 1.3% – 6.5% of developing 
nations’ credited deforestation reductions.184  Furthermore, as the 
global demand for carbon credits increases, inflation of carbon credits 
becomes less likely to occur.185 
The primary concern with issuing preventive credits is 
additionality.186  Issuing preventive credits may in fact lead to what 
some critics have dubbed as “hot air.”187  If HFLD nations are issued 
preventive credits, and sell these credits to Annex I countries that 
need the credits to meet their regulatory cap obligations, then the 
total quantity of emissions may actually be larger than would have 
 
 178. See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21, at 1645–46. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. da Fonseca et al., supra note 21. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 35. 
 187. Id. at 29. 
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otherwise been allowed.188  That is, if Annex I countries are allowed to 
pollute over their designated cap by purchasing these preventive 
credits, while at the same time, the developing nation is not actually 
decreasing emissions from deforestation below their business as usual 
rate, there is no net reduction in emissions.189  However, this problem 
must be considered relative to any plan that simply credits reduced 
deforestation (e.g., compensated reductions). 
While there may be a problem obtaining net emission reductions 
with preventive credits, the same is true if international leakage takes 
place.  For example, if Brazil adopts compensated reductions, and the 
market drivers of deforestation simply leak to an HFLD nation such 
as Columbia, there is no net reduction in emissions.  Given this same 
scenario, when both Brazil and Columbia have a financial incentive 
via carbon credits to limit deforestation, both nations will presumably 
take proactive measures to ensure that deforestation is sufficiently 
reduced and regulated.  Thus, the market drivers of deforestation will 
not have a favorable environment in which to continue deforestation 
efforts. 
The problem with additionality and preventive credits can be 
further ameliorated by capping the quantity of preventive credits that 
are tradable in any one commitment period.  Capping the trade of 
preventive credits in each commitment period limits the number of 
credits that do not represent actual carbon “offsets.”  This approach 
mandates that the vast majority of traded REDD carbon credits 
represent actual reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from nations 
that reduce their emissions from deforestation.  If an HFLD nation 
can only trade a certain portion of its preventive credits during any 
one commitment period, the effects of this “hot air” will be far less 
significant. 
Finally, participating governments in the REDD crediting 
scheme should receive adequate monetary compensation from 
trading credits to address the problems associated with deforestation 
in very poor regions of a country (e.g., slash and burn farming), where 
residents exploit forests out of necessity.190  For example, portions of 
the compensation earned from the sale of carbon credits could be 
 
 188. Id. at 29–30. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Thomas P. Tomich et al., Balancing Agricultural Development and Environmental 
Objectives: Assessing Tradeoffs in the Humid Tropics, in SLASH-AND-BURN AGRICULTURE: 
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 415, 437 (Cheryl A. Palm et al. eds., 2005). 
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applied to economic development projects in the poorer rural regions 
of Brazil. 
B.  European Commission Joint Research Centre Proposal 
Another proposal to address emissions from tropical 
deforestation is the European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(“JRC”) proposal.191  Like compensated reductions, this proposal 
addresses deforestation at the national level.192  This plan 
differentiates between intact and non-intact forests, as it accounts for 
both deforestation and forest degradation, which is referred to as 
forest “conversion.”193  Like compensated reductions, the JRC 
proposal establishes national baselines.194  However, in addition to 
national baselines, the JRC proposal also establishes a global 
conversion baseline.195  The reason for establishing two baselines is to 
reduce forest conversion in nations where significant deforestation 
and degradation is occurring, and to prevent deforestation and 
degradation in nations where it has yet to occur on a major scale.196  
Thus, the international baseline is used to distinguish nations with low 
forest conversion rates from those with high forest conversion rates.197  
The JRC proposal implements satellite technology to monitor forest 
conversion.198  In calculating carbon emission reductions, the carbon 
stock of non-intact forests is considered to contain half of the carbon 
stock of intact forests.199 
The JRC proposal creates two separate accounting systems: one 
system for nations with high conversion rates, and another for nations 
with low conversion rates.  The dividing line that differentiates the 
two groups is one-half the global conversion rate.  If a nation’s 
national conversion rate is higher than the global conversion rate 
 
 191. Frederic Achard et al., Accounting for Avoided Conversion of Intact and Non-Intact 
Forests: Technical Options and a Proposal for a Policy Tool 2, (European Commission Joint 
Research Centre discussion paper), available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/NR/rdonlyres/ 
D0207F59-8D5D-4362-A706-46AEE48619AA/0/JRCProposal.pdf. 
 192. Id.; see also Danilo Mollicone et al., An Incentive Mechanism for Reducing Emissions 
from Conversion of Intact and Non-intact Forests, 83 CLIMATIC CHANGE 477 (2007) (addressing 
the European Commission Joint Research Centre proposal). 
 193. Achard et al., supra note 192, at 2. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Achard et al., supra note 192, at 2. 
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baseline, then that nation must reduce its conversion rate to earn 
tradable credits.  Likewise, if a nation’s conversion rate is below the 
global conversion baseline, then that nation must continue to 
maintain its conversion rate below the global baseline to earn 
tradable credits.  Once a nation is placed into one of these two 
categories, its forests are valued and placed into one of the following 
sub-categories: (1) intact to non-intact, (2) intact to non-forest, or (3) 
non-intact to non-forest. A nation’s forest status is paired with its 
conversion rate, and this information is used to calculate the nation’s 
overall conversion rate over the commitment period, which 
determines the type of tradable carbon credits that are issued.200 
The credits issued are temporary and are issued to participating 
nations on an annual basis.201  The goal of this approach is to avoid the 
permanence problem, as the drafters were concerned about the 
volatility of preserved carbon via tropical forests.202  Carbon preserved 
in rainforests is “volatile” because preserved carbon can be released 
through illegal logging, wildfires, and increased logging in later 
commitment periods.203 
One drawback of the JRC proposal is its relative complexity 
compared to the compensated reductions plan.  While the JRC 
proposal’s distinction between intact and non-intact forests makes 
sense, it may lead to some confusion in the initial pilot runs of any 
forest carbon credit system.  Moreover, it could be marred by the 
same cumbersome procedural requirement red tape that has rendered 
the CDM ineffective.  Perhaps the international community would be 
better served by the implementation of the JRC or a JRC-like plan in 
later commitment periods after a REDD crediting scheme has been 
implemented.  This would provide time to gain a sense of how such a 
plan would function in actual practice.  Nevertheless, the JRC 
proposal contains an element that is essential to any effective REDD 
crediting proposal—crediting nations that have effectively conserved 
their forests and do not have high deforestation rates (i.e., HFLD 
nations). 
 
 200. Id. at 3. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. (“[T]hese [credits] should be considered only as temporary preserved carbon, 
because of the non-permanent nature of such preserved carbon.”). 
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IV.  THE HYBRID COMPENSATED REDUCTIONS AND PREVENTIVE 
CREDITS PROPOSAL 
This section describes the components of a hybrid proposal that 
integrates the advantages of the two proposals addressed in Part III.  
It discusses how this new plan responds to the challenges in crediting 
reductions in deforestation discussed in Part II, how such credits 
could be financed, and the legal framework under which this proposal 
could be implemented to ensure optimal impact. 
A. Components of the Proposal 
This plan combines elements from the compensated reductions 
and the JRC proposals.  Like compensated reductions, entry into the 
hybrid plan is voluntary for any developing tropical nation.  However, 
after a nation implements the hybrid plan and earns tradable credits 
for initial reductions or preventive measures, it is then bound for 
future commitment periods.  Under the hybrid plan, an international 
baseline is set from the global tropical deforestation rate, calculated 
by using each tropical nation’s deforestation rate over a recent span 
of years (e.g., 1995–2005) to create a global deforestation average.  
The hybrid plan accounts for deforestation, not forest conversion.  
Thus, it requires the parties to the treaty to determine what level of 
forest degradation is to be monitored (e.g., selective logging, clear-cut 
logging, slash and burn tactics, and land conversion) as well as the 
level of disturbance that will constitute “deforestation” for purposes 
of monitoring and accounting. 
Like the baseline set in the JRC proposal, this international 
baseline will be set below the global deforestation average for 
developing tropical nations.  For example, it could be set at one-half 
of the global tropical deforestation average.  Along with the 
international baseline, participating nations will also set a national 
baseline determined by the particular nation’s domestic deforestation 
rate over a set period.  To ensure uniformity, each nation’s domestic 
deforestation rate is measured over the same span of years from 
which the international average is calculated. 
After the international and domestic baselines are set, 
participating nations would be placed into one of two categories.  
Category I consists of those nations whose domestic deforestation 
rate is higher than the international baseline.  Category I nations will 
operate on the compensated reductions system. Category II consists 
of those nations whose domestic deforestation rate is lower than the 
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international baseline.  These nations will operate on a preventive 
credits system. 
Category I nations will be assigned a national baseline based on 
the average of their past deforestation rates over a set period.  If a 
nation successfully reduces its deforestation rate below its national 
baseline during the commitment period, the nation will be issued 
tradable carbon certificates equivalent to the amount of carbon 
emissions reduced.  The amount of credits allotted to a Category I 
nation for reductions below the baseline should be determined by the 
participating nations.  As an example, Category I credits could be 
determined according to the quantity of measurement units (e.g., 
acres) by which a particular nation reduced its deforestation rate from 
its baseline yearly average.  Thus, each measurement unit will 
represent a certain quantity of stored carbon.  Because tropical 
forests differ globally, and one acre of forest in one nation may store 
more carbon than one acre of forest in another nation,204 
measurement units could be adjusted per nation to ensure each 
carbon credit represents the same amount of net carbon reduction. 
Category II nations will operate on a preventive credits system.  
Under this system, a nation’s forests will be measured to determine 
how much carbon is stored therein.  A nation’s forests will be valued 
by assigning a plot of land (e.g., an acre) an approximate amount of 
stored carbon, and credits will be issued in each commitment period 
according to the quantity of carbon preserved (i.e., any accounted 
tract of forest that has a level of forest disturbance below the 
monitoring level).205 
Baselines may need to be readjusted to ensure that they 
accurately reflect the current status of tropical deforestation in a 
particular country.  This approach makes certain baselines reflect 
realistic targets for each nation.  For example, a Category I nation 
that is not successful in decreasing deforestation during the first 
commitment period, and increases its national deforestation rate, may 
no longer have any incentive to decrease deforestation.  The reason 
for this phenomenon is that as a nation falls from its national 
baseline, it is less likely to be successful in achieving its target 
reduction to earn tradable credits.  Consequently, the market drivers 
 
 204. See generally Robert W. Malmsheimer et al., Forest Management Solutions for 
Mitigating Climate Change in the United States, 106 J. FORESTRY 115–173 (2008). 
 205. As is the case with Category I nations, it must also be determined for Category II 
nations what minimum disturbance will constitute “deforestation” for purposes of monitoring 
and accounting preventive credits. 
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of deforestation will be more powerful, especially in the short-term, 
for these nations, which significantly diminishes any further incentive 
to participate in the hybrid plan.  If baselines are adjusted, however, 
nations whose initial baseline target has become unattainable will still 
have an incentive to decrease deforestation in future commitment 
periods.206 
Conversely, a Category I nation that successfully implements the 
hybrid plan may operate on a baseline much lower than its initial 
national baseline. Consequently, the credits this nation receives in 
subsequent commitment periods will not reflect any actual reduction 
in carbon emissions, which will cause additionality concerns.207  Thus, 
while it is essential to maintain national baselines at a constant level 
for several commitment periods, it may be necessary to reevaluate 
them to ensure the baselines represent realistic targets for each 
nation.208 
The international baseline should be adjusted every two 
commitment periods (approximately every 10 years), as decreasing or 
increasing trends in tropical deforestation may increase or reduce the 
global average.  Changes in the international baseline are important, 
as some Category I nations may decrease deforestation to rates below 
the international baseline.  Under these circumstances, Category I 
nations will be re-designated as Category II, and will operate on the 
preventive credits system.209  For nations initially designated as 
Category II, these nations may increase their deforestation rate above 
the international baseline.  Under these circumstances, Category II 
nations may be re-designated as Category I nations. 
B.  Addressing Monitoring, Permanence, Additionality, and Leakage 
Like other plans that credit tropical nations for REDD activities, 
the hybrid plan must address monitoring, permanence, additionality, 
and leakage.  For monitoring, satellite and radar technology is 
 
 206. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 40. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Baseline adjustment could occur either on an as needed basis determined by the 
governing parties to a treaty, or more preferably, on a set baseline reevaluation system, where 
baselines are reevaluated, for example, every ten years or two comment periods. 
 209. At first glance this may seem disadvantageous to a particular Category I nation which 
has been very successful in decreasing deforestation.  However, due to baseline adjustment, this 
nation’s baseline would be adjusted making it more difficult to earn as many credits.  Therefore, 
shifting a nation to the preventive credits system may actually prove to be more profitable for 
that nation in terms of credits earned. 
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becoming so advanced today that even selective logging projects can 
be monitored.210  Moreover, computer modeling is available to track 
deforestation trends.211  At the 2006 UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice REDD workshop, experts 
concluded that the remote sensing technology that currently exists is 
sufficient to adequately measure deforestation.212 
The biggest challenge with monitoring is that many nations 
cannot afford the necessary technology to effectively monitor their 
tropical forests.213  The most effective way to combat this financial 
problem is through international funding.  International funds can be 
implemented to aid developing nations in acquiring the necessary 
infrastructure to make the hybrid plan a reality.  One potential source 
for international funding is the Global Environment Facility (GEF).  
The GEF is administered by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Environment Programme, and the United Nations Development 
Programme.214  The GEF has been the primary mechanism for 
financially assisting developing nations in addressing global 
environmental problems.215  The GEF’s funding is restricted to 
funding the costs of implementing measures to address six 
international environmental problems: climate change, ozone 
depletion, conservation of biological diversity, protection of 
international waters, desertification, and organic pollutants.216  The 
GEF also funds incremental activities that address land degradation, 
desertification, and deforestation.217  In addition to addressing global 
environmental problems, the GEF provides the primary source of 
funding for the Climate Change Convention.218  The hybrid plan 
meets several of these funding parameters, and is thus a worthy 
candidate for GEF funding.  Importantly, however, the hybrid plan 
must operate through the UNFCCC to be eligible for GEF funding.219 
Another potential source of funding for the hybrid plan is the 
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which was 
 
 210. Mitchell et al., supra note 128, at 33. 
 211. Id. at 19. 
 212. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 31. 
 213. See infra Part II. A. 
 214. Hunter et al., supra note 9, at 1584. 
 215. Id. at 1583. 
 216. Id. at 1584. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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launched at the December 2007 COP in Bali, Indonesia.220  This $350 
million fund is designed in part to assist developing nations obtain the 
required infrastructure needed to participate in REDD markets.221  
The World Bank, however, is not looked upon favorably by all, 
especially by many environmental organizations.  For example, 
environmentalists have criticized the World Bank for being one of the 
key supporters of Amazon cattle ranching.222  Therefore, while the 
World Bank is unveiling plans to the UN to curb deforestation,223 it is 
at the same time funding one of the main industries driving 
deforestation in the Amazon.224  Nevertheless, the World Bank is 
currently the most viable source of funding for many developing 
nations to establish adequate monitoring systems.225  Importantly, 
funding from either the GEF or the FCPF should only be temporary.  
Once a nation earns tradable carbon credits under the hybrid plan, 
these nations should use the income generated from these credits to 
fund the costs of monitoring. 
The hybrid plan ensures permanence of credits by requiring 
Category I nations that have received tradable credits for reductions 
in one commitment period and have subsequently increased 
deforestation in a later commitment period to make up for this 
increased deforestation before any future credits will be issued.  Thus, 
the amount of increased deforestation will be a mandatory target for 
the nation in the next commitment period.226  This method ensures 
that nations are unable to profit by earning and trading credits for 
conserving an area of forest and then later deforesting the area.  
Permanence is a different issue for Category II nations.  In these 
nations, any increase in deforestation will simply result in fewer 
tradable carbon credits. 
 
 220. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 17. 
 221. Indonesia has applied for funding under this program and is developing domestic 
REDD regulations that are expected to be released in 2009.  David Fogarty, Indonesia Applies 
for World Bank Forest CO2 Scheme, Carbon Offsets Daily, Mar. 4, 2009, http:// 
uk.reuters.com/article/idUKSP394051. 
 222. Daniel Howden, World Bank Pledges to Save Trees…Then Helps Cut Down Amazon 
Forest, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
environment/climate-change/world-bank-pledges-to-save-trees-then-helps-cut-down-amazon-
forest-769997.html. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See generally Moutinho et al., supra note 18. 
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A key issue is how to treat a nation that loses an expanse of 
tropical forest due to non-anthropocentric means, such as a naturally 
occurring fire.  This phenomenon is common in tropical nations in 
years of drought, and for areas of forest near land that has been 
cleared by humans for agricultural activities or logging.227  Because 
tropical forest fires seem to be positively correlated with human 
deforestation and degradation of forested regions,228 it seems the most 
effective way to account for tracts of forest lost to fire is simply to 
calculate that area lost into the nation’s deforestation rate.  This 
approach will also prevent nations from fraudulently burning forest to 
clear land for other activities. 
The tradeoff between additionality and leakage lies at the heart 
of the hybrid plan.  Simply crediting REDD activities at the national 
level will inevitably lead to international leakage.229  On the other 
hand, issuing preventive credits to HFLD nations poses additionality 
issues, as this may result in “hot air,” with no overall net reduction in 
carbon emissions resulting from the trade of preventive credits.  
However, when viewing this problem in relation to the compensated 
reductions plan, the potential for hot air resulting from the trade of 
preventive credits is less an issue of additionality and more a problem 
of international leakage.  The benefits of issuing preventive credits 
outweigh the drawbacks.  Measures can be taken to reduce the 
amount of hot air in any one commitment period.  For example, 
restricting the amount of preventive credits that may be traded in a 
particular commitment period reduces the potential for hot air.  With 
an appropriate, restricted level of credits in the market, Category II 
nations will earn enough compensation to withstand the pressures of 
international leakage, while developed nations will not be able to 
purchase a substantial amount of these preventive credits because of 
the preventive credit trading caps per comment period.  The most 
credits tradable on the carbon market at any one time from the 
hybrid plan will be those traded by Category I nations, which 
guarantees actual net reductions in carbon emissions from decreased 
deforestation. 
 
 227. Rhett A. Butler, 2007 Amazon Fires Among Worst Ever, MONGA BAY, Oct. 22, 2007, 
http://news.mongabay.com/2007/1021-amazon.html. 
 228. Ane Alencar et al., Carbon Emissions Associated with Forest Fires in Brazil, in 
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan 
Schwartzman eds., 2005). 
 229. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 47. 
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Therefore, hot air from preventive credits is less of a problem 
than international leakage, as hot air can be adequately monitored 
and regulated by the markets.  International leakage, on the other 
hand, cannot be adequately monitored because it is not a component 
of the emissions trading scheme, but is instead a reaction to it, 
thereby limiting the regulated community’s control over the problem. 
C.  Which Legal Framework? 
Another critical issue is the legal framework under which the 
hybrid plan would operate.  This topic has been discussed in the 
context of compensated reductions, and that discussion is relevant 
when thinking about potential legal frameworks for the hybrid plan.  
One option that has been explored is amending the CDM to credit 
reductions in deforestation.230 
The main advantage of amending the CDM is that it is relatively 
straightforward, and it operates within an existing framework.231  
Theoretically, the hybrid plan could be incorporated into the CDM 
by simply amending the Marrakesh Accords232 to allow land use, land 
use change, and forestry (LULUCF) projects.233  As simple as it may 
sound, incorporating the hybrid plan into the CDM would not work. 
First, the Marrakesh Accords, the process during which the 
CDM was established, involved extensive negotiation.234  Attempting 
to fit the hybrid plan into the CDM would undermine and potentially 
undo these fragile terms.235  In the formative negotiations of the 
CDM, accounting for LULUCF was a controversial issue, and the 
negotiating parties struggled to reach a satisfactory agreement.236  
Opponents of incorporating LULUCF into the CDM argued that 
because the carbon reductions due to forestry projects could not be 
accurately measured, they did not satisfy Article 12(5)(b) of the 
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Kyoto Protocol.237  Second, the CDM is a project-level mechanism, 
and the hybrid plan operates on the national and international 
levels.238  Third, the Marrakesh Accords declared that that LULUCF 
projects cannot exceed 5% of base year emissions for the Annex I 
country in the first commitment period.239  If a similar cap on 
LULUCF activities is implemented in the next commitment period, it 
would severely limit the extent to which developing nations may 
participate in the carbon market, and would not allow the hybrid plan 
to operate on a large enough scale to fully address the tropical 
deforestation problem.240  Fourth, amending the CDM would require 
that participating parties must be parties to Kyoto, and this may 
disqualify some potential participants.241  Finally, the CDM’s strict 
additionality requirement242 would nullify any plan to incorporate 
preventive credits, thus ruling out the hybrid plan as a possible 
option. 
A second and more viable legal option would be to implement 
the hybrid plan into Kyoto’s post-2012 successor when such an 
instrument is developed.  Since the hybrid plan focuses on 
deforestation and its relation to climate change, this plan would likely 
garner support under the UNFCCC framework.  The hybrid plan 
could easily be incorporated into the successor to the Kyoto Protocol 
because many of the terms that make incorporating the hybrid plan 
into Kyoto difficult could be amended.  Assuming that all of the 
current parties to Kyoto ratify the post-2012 agreement, another 
benefit of this option is that there would already be a significant base 
of nations that are parties to the agreement, which would ensure a 
significant market for the credits issued under the hybrid plan. 
A third option is to create an entirely new protocol under the 
UNFCCC, or perhaps even an agreement outside of the climate 
change framework (e.g., the UN Forum on Forests).243  Operating 
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completely outside of the Kyoto or Kyoto-successor framework 
would have several advantages.  One advantage is that nations that 
have not become parties to Kyoto may be more willing to adopt this 
new treaty.244  The United States is a prime example of such a nation. 
However, one major disadvantage to this option is that it does not 
guarantee parties access to the carbon markets.245  The existing carbon 
markets are essentially a product of Kyoto.246  If the emissions 
reductions credits issued through the hybrid plan are not accepted 
under the Kyoto or Kyoto-successor framework, there will be little 
demand for these credits.  If the parties to Kyoto cannot use the 
emissions credits issued under the hybrid plan to meet their emissions 
cap obligations, it would be a major blow to a new agreement outside 
the Kyoto system.  Furthermore, it is impossible to predict how many 
nations would ratify this new treaty.  Therefore, such an accord does 
not guarantee the same consensus that a post-Kyoto agreement is 
likely to have. 
CONCLUSION 
Tropical rainforest conservation is an essential step in responding 
to the global climate change crisis.  Given current rates of tropical 
deforestation, the time to act is now.  Any post-2012 climate change 
treaty or forest conservation treaty must address emissions from 
tropical deforestation if significant reductions in global carbon 
dioxide emissions are to be achieved.  Moreover, implementing 
measures and incentives to preserve the world’s tropical forests offers 
benefits that extend far beyond the value that such preservation 
provides in reducing global carbon emissions from avoided 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
Under the existing Kyoto framework and the CDM mechanism, 
there is no opportunity to earn credits for avoided deforestation.  The 
hybrid plan proposed in this article is a valuable first step in 
addressing this problem.  The most significant challenge for any 
crediting system for reduced deforestation is the tradeoff between 
additionality and leakage.  The hybrid plan does not completely 
resolve this issue, but the benefits gained by eliminating potential 
international leakage outweigh potential additionality issues.  
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Moreover, the hybrid plan could be readily incorporated into the 
post-Kyoto regulatory framework—and thereby capitalize on the 
consensus reflected in the existing Kyoto regime—by 
institutionalizing REDD as a component of a mandatory regulatory 
scheme to combat global climate change. 
 
